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Introduction  
 
The Question 
 
This thesis addresses itself to the question ‘to what extent the institutions of the 
Eurozone, particularly the European Central Bank (ECB), are the by-product of self 
interested strategic interests and thus were destined to be inadequate to manage a 
collective economy?’ The formation of the Eurozone (Zone) towards the end of the 20th 
Century was an attempt to further unify Europe through the creation of a collective and 
competitive economy. Its establishment, however, was not undertaken in a political 
vacuum and the Eurozone has been at crucial stages of the process, shaped by specific 
forces and interests, which were more individual than collective. This structuring has 
meant that the Eurozone has not necessarily acted in an economically congruous or 
collectively advantageous manner. The Sovereign Debt Crisis (SDC) starkly revealed 
the inherent issues in the economic and political behaviour of select Eurozone member 
states, mostly in what is considered Periphery, and the manner in which they are 
governed on a national level. This thesis however aims to go further in demonstrating 
on an institutional level the strategically implemented limitations of Eurozone 
governance that permitted some member states to exploit the Euro for nationalistic gain 
at the expense of cohesive economic governance. This thesis refocuses the argument 
associated with the Eurozone around the embedded power asymmetry and the 
individualistic outlook of some member states at the expense of the collective interest 
rather than purely the national narratives the Sovereign Debt Crisis revealed. 
 
Structure 
 
This thesis traces the development Eurozone from the late 1990s to 2011, 
providing an overview of the creation of key institutions, such as the ECB, that allowed 
for the exploitation of the lack of structural cohesion and oversight of the European 
economy. This thesis will argue that dominant strategic interests influenced the 
establishment of new governance structures, deliberately limiting the effective 
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economic development and governance of the Zone as a whole.  Whilst the Eurozone 
has been the subject of significant amount of academic analysis, most of this literature 
has focused on crisis management or individual member state responsibility, rather than 
seeking to understand the core institutional reasons underlying the Eurozone’s issues. 
This thesis aims to reframe the analysis of the formation and subsequent development 
of the Eurozone by applying Bob Jessop’s Strategic Relational Approach (SRA), 
highlighting the inherent power structures and bias that were exploited by stronger state 
actors in the creation of new state spaces.  
 
Core concepts of the SRA relevant to the undertaking of this task are outlined in 
Chapter One. It is argued that these provide a framework through which to highlight the 
interests of key member states in the establishment of the Eurozone. The SRA 
framework provides a series of analytical tools necessary to examine the manner in 
which power and capitalism interacted to perpetuate the ideology of the Core member 
states. Jessop’s ability to focus on the level of high politics and governance, which for 
the sake of this thesis will be state actors and superstate institutions, streamlines the 
analysis to a limited but functional set of actors. This unit of analysis emphasises the 
importance of governance and the spaces these actors operate in within the context of 
capitalist accumulation. The SRA grounds this thesis in terms of the actors and groups 
operating for self interest, attempting to maximise their strategic advantage through the 
shaping of the collective structures and rules of the Eurozone.  
 
With this in mind, the second chapter of this thesis explores the foundation of 
the Eurozone with the creation of key treaties and the establishment of the European 
Central Bank (ECB). This section explores the importance of the governing ideology 
and context that underpinned the development of these constituent agreements, and 
identifies the actors who were crucial to shaping them. It becomes clear that the 
Eurozone is a divided and asymmetric economy with an entrenched ideology in favour 
of a Core group of influential member states, particularly Germany and France. This 
foundation allows the Eurozone’s institutions and governance to exist as economically 
irrational, yet politically explainable and coherent. The Zone’s creation also introduced 
a new level of supranational governance institution and actor, in the form of the ECB. 
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The ECB was given extraordinary autonomy and operates under an ideology favoured 
by and, implemented for, the Core. This thesis will analyse the reasoning behind some 
of the powers given to (and limitations imposed on) the ECB, and the parameters of the 
Eurozone’s economic governance. Due to their various design deficiencies the official 
structures of the Eurozone were surprisingly left with significant vulnerabilities and 
strategic gaps in governance. These vulnerabilities are explored in Chapter 3.  
 
Though the Eurozone was ostensibly designed with the intent to create a single, 
holistic European economy, this vision has not come to fruition. Chapter 3 highlights 
the strategic shortcomings of economic governance at the supranational level, which, in 
part impeded the realisation of economic integration. The economic ideology governing 
much of the Eurozone assumed that a great deal of convergence and unity would occur. 
In fact, to the contrary, member states engaged in competitive labour policy, fiscal and 
financial competition and biased firm behaviour. The lack of supervision or intervention 
in these areas, whilst they were well documented, allowed for dramatic asymmetric 
divergences, making it not only harder to govern the Zone, but creating additional 
vulnerabilities. Whilst the Core was able to materially advance its position globally and 
regionally by exploiting these policies and opportunities. This behaviour dramatically 
threatened the Periphery and weakened the Euro as a whole in the long run.  
 
This process culminates with the impact of the Sovereign Debt Crisis (SDC or 
Crisis) and in response the re-embedding of the strategic interests of the same group of 
influential member states with, and in, the creation of the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) in 2010. Chapter Four explores how the Crisis exposed the many 
weakness of the Eurozone, especially its lack of adaptability to the changing pressures 
of global finance and also the Eurozone’s futile response to collective crisis 
management. The Eurozone and the ECB had its hands tied by the ideology of late 20th 
Century advanced by the pervasive interests of the Core. This ideology, a combination 
of Ordoliberal and Neoliberalism, was embedded in these governance institutions that 
were exposed as fundamentally inadequate to deal or contain the Crisis. It is for these 
reasons that the Eurozone resorted to the creation of new institutions. However these 
institutions re-established the primacy of the Core and its interests and relations. In 
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doing so, the Eurozone demonstrated how little it had learned from the mistakes of the 
ECB.  
 
This thesis intentionally ends in 2011, a year after the creation of the EFSF, to 
highlight the lack of progress Europe had made in dis-embedding strategic power 
relations. A year after the EFSF’s establishment allows for a analysis of its governing 
structure and the strategic biases it was advancing. From the perspective of 2015 it must 
be acknowledged that much progress has been made since 2011, with the establishment 
of new supranational institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism. However 
the scope of this thesis is on strategic positioning of states and the manipulation of 
institutions by using the EFSF as an exemplar of the lack of progress the Zone had 
made in the critical area of collective governance. 
 
 
Parameters of this Research 
 
In order for this thesis to maintain clarity it is necessary to define and 
contextualise some of the terminology that will be utilised in establishing the 
parameters of this investigation. The analysis within this thesis will focus on the 
Eurozone as it is centred around the implications of the ECB and the Monetary Union. 
Whilst it must be recognised that the Eurozone is a subset of the broader European 
Union, in order to centre the analysis, this thesis will focus on those member states that 
were most heavily impacted by these governance bodies and strategic relations. 
Practically, therefore, the Eurozone states are all nations using the Euro as official legal 
tender and under the governance of the ECB (including Germany, France, Italy, 
Belgium, Greece, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Netherlands, 
Finland, Cyprus, Latvia Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Estonia). Due to limitations 
on the scope of this thesis, it will only examine a select few as representatives of the 
Core and Periphery, with an emphasis on how these groupings interact with each other. 
This thesis will utilise Germany and France as representatives of the Core with the two 
largest and some of the fastest adjusting economies, whilst Greece is selected as acting 
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as the (extreme) representative of the Periphery (Sapir 2009: 264). However the 
Periphery’s widely accepted definition includes the Mediterranean nations, Greece, 
Italy, Spain, along with some of the smaller and slower adjusting nations such as 
Portugal and Ireland.  
 
It is acknowledged that there are a range of institutions that contribute to the 
governance and oversight of the Eurozone, however it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to mention all of them. Some notable absences from this thesis include the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Parliament, and the Bank for International Settlements. 
All of these institutions have contributed to the governance of the Eurozone and the 
ECB, with their efforts (arguably) being most prevalent during the Sovereign Debt 
Crisis.  
 
This thesis also requires the introduction of some contested concepts, and, at this 
point, it is necessary to outline the functional definitions that will be used. First, there is 
the concept of Ordoliberalism (also known as German neoliberalism). It is a school of 
thought associated with a strong state and a focus on ‘entrepreneurship, private property 
and the free price mechanism’ (Bonefeld 2012: 633-4).  It views economic agents as a 
necessary component of the capitalist economy, but whose greed requires containment 
in order to prevent society’s destruction (Bonefeld 2012: 633-4). It is a form of state-
led, but individualistic governance, which originated in Germany in the 1920s. This 
ideology is one that was not heavily utilised elsewhere. However, this thesis will aim to 
highlight the subtle exporting of Germany ideology throughout the creation of the 
Eurozone institutions. This thesis analyses a period that is largely considered the 
neoliberal era, and whilst this is a highly contentious concept, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that the Eurozone’s experience of neoliberalism is highly varied. There is 
‘spatial variegation' - where each local experience of ‘neoliberalisation’ is shaped by 
existing and unique institutional, ideological, and cultural context, resulting in different 
'neoliberalisms’ (Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2009:183). This has meant that whilst all 
of Europe experienced some variation of ‘privatization, marketization and deregulation 
as well as the macroeconomic policies of inflation-targeting,’ how it has been expressed 
and the extent to which it has been beneficial is varied (Cahill 2014:xi). Whilst not 
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heavily utilised throughout this thesis, this concept provides the context to the nature of 
capitalist accumulation in the years preceding the Eurozone’s establishment, and 
through its first decade of development.  
 
 
Why does this Research matter? 
 
This research attempts to refocus the debate around the Eurozone in terms of 
strategic relationships at play in the Eurozone, rather than purely focusing on the actions 
and behaviours of individual nations or purely a structural analysis of the ECB. Instead 
this thesis aims to confront the shortcomings of the Eurozone from the perspectives of 
strategy and governance. Rather than attribute blame, it highlights the inherent 
inefficiencies and ideological rigidities in an attempt to refocus the debate about the 
Eurozone as a product of its member states relationships and an understanding of its 
economic rationale going forward. The asymmetric and multispeed nature of the 
Eurozone is a feature that is crucial to understanding the shortcoming of the Zone’s 
governance. It is hoped that by framing the debate around how these features came to be 
exacerbated and entrenched, that a more encompassing and unified approach to the 
Eurozone’s economy could be conceived. The Eurozone is a significant component of 
the global economy, and understanding the foundational causes of its instability and the 
shortcomings of its governance is vital for it, its members and all those who deal with 
them.  
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Chapter 1 
The Strategic Relational Approach 	  
Introduction 
 
In order to analyse the complex multi-scalar actions of state actors it is necessary 
to have an adaptable analytical framework. It is for this reason that this thesis will 
utilise the Strategic Relational Approach (SRA). The construction of the Eurozone, and 
its shortcomings exposed through the Sovereign Debt Crisis, involve a range of state 
actors, institutions and strategic settings that are best framed through a paradigm that 
can conceive of the importance of social setting and motivation. Accordingly, Jessop’s 
SRA is the most functional framework, placing the emphasis on the actor’s motivation 
and strategic capabilities given the social structures that have been constructed. As this 
thesis will follow the construction of institutions within the Eurozone, the SRA has the 
flexibility to analyse the strategic advantages inherent in the establishment of these 
institutions (particularly the European Central Bank) and the perpetuation of the 
capabilities of certain states. This chapter of the thesis will outline the Strategic 
Relational Approach; it will then broadly apply it to the European context. It will then 
be necessary to frame the important analytical tools the SRA utilises, including state 
form and accumulation strategies. Finally, as this thesis is a temporal study spanning 
from the 1990s to 2011, this chapter will draw together how, according to Jessop, 
institutional change is strategically achieved. This will lay the foundation from which it 
will be possible to analyse the states involved and the institutions of the Eurozone that 
exacerbated the systemic crisis of governance revealed by the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
(SDC).  
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1.1 What is the SRA? 
 
Boldly stated, the SRA is a theory designed to conceive of social power and the 
choices within a system. The SRA, like many social theories, highlights the importance 
of both structure and agency (Cotton 2015: 321; Knops 2015: 3). What makes the SRA 
unique is its ability to connect them through ‘strategic’ motivations (Jessop 2008: 203). 
In broad terms this refocuses analysis on how norms and institutions come to be shaped 
by agents through the advancing their own interests; and conversely how different 
agents are constrained and influenced by the pre-existing norms (Jessop 2003: 101). It 
allows for the construction of structures and institutions to be viewed as a process 
mediated by the strategic interests of a variety of interested agents (Biebricher 2013: 
394). The theory provides a lens to analyse change, both on an institutional level and 
also through the way in which agents position themselves to optimise the number of 
strategies available to them. The theory does not claim agents have any superior 
foresight or ability to predict the outcomes of their interests and strategies, but frames 
all behaviour as an attempt at optimisation of outcomes.  
 
From this perspective, the SRA framework is able to introduce concepts to 
analyse capitalism and the relations between dominant and subordinate groups in 
reproducing structures that continue to preference their interests. This process is seen as 
inherently political on all levels. This political nature highlights the struggle and 
positioning of forces in order to maintain their empowerment (or resist their 
disempowerment), with agents’ strategies frequently being multi-level games, involving 
contingency and re-engagement with the same actors and structures. In relation to the 
state, which can be seen as any governance institution, this reinforcement is also a 
matter of survival (Jessop 2008: 35). The state (and in Europe’s case, multilevel 
governance) is required to secure the ‘extra economic’ conditions, institutionally and 
socially necessary to perpetuate certain interests and maintain stability, thus benefitting 
dominant interests (Jessop 2012: 7). The promotion of capitalist accumulation is 
necessary for the state to execute basic functions, and thus it must promote certain 
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social conditions that support capitalist interests for it to perpetuate itself. In the context 
of the Eurozone, this is true of both nation states and the supranational institutions (such 
as the ECB).  As it will be seen, these interests are not always complimentary nor in the 
best interest of all actors.   
 
 
 
1.2 How the SRA frames the Eurozone? 
 
The creation of, and subsequent political developments in the Eurozone have left 
it with a complex set of agents, interests and institutions to analyse. The SRA, however, 
has a variety of tools that are equipped to frame and deconstruct the power struggle and 
the subsequent construction of new state spaces and institutions that occurred.  In light 
of this, three important justifications for the SRA can be made as to why it is an 
appropriate methodology for analysing the Eurozone. First, the Eurozone involves 
strategic action at the level of states, state-institutions and newly created supra-state 
institutions (such as the European Central Bank (ECB)). In this context the SRA is able 
to view state behaviour as mostly homogenous: though states are composed of 
contradictory forces and their actions are not always consistent ,their actions are unified 
(Kelly 1999: 110-11). On a supra-national level, the Eurozone institutions are able to act 
as a state form, however incomplete, delivering governance across national boundaries. 
Certain groups are acting strategically at both levels, advancing their own position. This 
strategic element is crucial, because the Eurozone required state actors to concede part 
of their sovereignty to enable the creation of new institutions and actors, namely the 
single market and the ECB.  
 
These spaces required the establishment of new rules, and an acknowledgement 
of how other agents were going to strategically behave once they were created. In 
practical terms this is a limitation upon the capabilities of actors, such as monetary and 
fiscal policy autonomy. The creation of these structures also necessitates a change in 
behaviour as the structures influence the ability for certain strategies and introduces new 
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non nation-state actors, such as the ECB. Second, the SRA is adaptable to multiple 
layers of governance, and territorial boundaries. This feature is imperative for 
examining the structures of the Eurozone, as it requires supra-state action, with 
individually motivated member states still pursuing strategic interests, upon an uneven 
strategic terrain. Third, in order to contextualize the Eurozone there needs to be a 
framework that can simultaneously highlight the role of accumulation and grouping by 
class interests. 
 
 
1.3 SRA’s Analytical Tools  
1.3.1 State projects  
 
The SRA is able to utilise the analytical perception of state projects in order to 
frame the behaviour of the European states within the system. For Jessop (2008: 9), the 
state apparatus is generally defined as: 
 
‘a distinct ensemble of institutions and organisations whose socially accepted 
function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members 
of a society in the name of their general will.’ 
 
 This broad definition encapsulates both the traditional nation-states that make up the 
countries of the Eurozone, and also those supranational institutions that are set up for 
multi-scalar governance of this territory, such as the ECB. Conceptually, this allows for 
state governance to be a multilayered and fluid process that is socially dictated as the 
product, object and determinant of struggle and contest.  
 
This conceptualisation highlights how states appear simultaneously unified in 
their ability to execute functions, whilst being internally subject to countervailing 
strategies and interests. Using Jessop’s precursor, Poulantzas, the state within this 
framework can be seen as ‘intrinsically and internally differentiated’, constantly 
engaging in compromise internally in order to execute policies and aims (Poulantzas in 
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Bruff 2008: 2). This differentiation is derived from the fact that states are constructed in 
part by social classes, each with their own strategic interests in advancing their position 
through state institutions and policies, such as the ECB. States have a ‘structurally 
mediated bias’ towards some groups that allows those groups greater influence over 
policy and state action (Kelly 1999: 110-11). This ‘structurally mediated bias’ can come 
in the form of direct political influence, but it is often a by-product of economic power. 
The state depends on the perpetuation of capital and markets, and cannot escape this 
capitalist social context (Bruff 2012: 182). This bias is unavoidable, however it is not a 
top-down imposition but rather it is a social expression of class conflict occurring at any 
given time with selective strategic interests (Bruff 2012: 183). 
 
 
1.3.2 Accumulation Strategies  
 
The SRA is also able to analyse the complex social structural composition of the 
state through the prism of capitalistic accumulation. The second concept from the SRA 
that is useful to this thesis is the concept of accumulation strategies. According to 
Jessop’s theory, accumulation strategies are: 
 
‘the specific pattern or model of economic growth together with both … [an] 
associated social framework of institutions and the range of government policies 
conducive to its stable reproduction.’ (Brenner 2004: 86)  
 
These strategies gain acceptance through a process of struggle resulting in the approval 
of dominant groups and ‘fractions of capital’ (Jessop 2012: 105). However, this process 
is not predetermined or deterministic. The process is dependent upon a variety of social 
conditions. Capitalism is reliant on the state for its expanded reproduction, which the 
market alone cannot provide (Jessop 2001b: 84, 87; Biebricher 2013: 394-5). For this 
thesis, this concept illuminates how the ECB attempted to integrate various existing 
national accumulation strategies and the different interests at play, creating institutions 
that clearly favoured specific groups (Jessop 2012: 105).   
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The role of the state is socially constructed, entrenching in it the extra-economic 
requirements that allow capitalism to operate, but separating it from the ‘circuit of 
capital’, and thus giving it an institutionally contingent ‘ability to function as an agent 
of capitalist interest’ (Brenner 2004: 84). Whilst the state has a vested interest in 
maintaining the necessary means for the execution of its power, according to Jessop this 
does not give state a deterministic, systemic, structurally prescribed course of action 
(Brenner 2004: 87). Instead it means the state, and various of the institutions that 
compose it, favour certain types of accumulation. The form of which this takes can 
vary, as with the increasing role of finance in the Eurozone. It is important to point out 
that Jessop’s state is never complete or finite, as it acts as a social relation. It is 
constantly engaging in compromise to appease the groups that compose it (Bruff 2012: 
183). Whilst the state does selectively benefit groups, which groups benefit can change 
along with capitalism itself. The structure is not indefinitely rigid.  
 
In this context, whilst there is a preference towards certain accumulation 
strategies for certain agents, the state and governing structures are capable of changing 
style. The state, however, does play a role in promoting the conditions necessary for 
capitalism’s expanded reproduction. State projects in the context of a liberalised 
capitalist model are the reinforming mechanism that normatively creates the ideal 
conditions for accumulation using their socially accepted extra-economic coercion 
(Brenner 2004: 86; Jessop 1983: 91-93). For the Eurozone this process has seen the rise 
of neoliberal accumulation strategies, and Ordoliberal accumulation patterns which 
have gained traction in the new state spaces, subordinating less powerful accumulation 
strategies used by the Periphery (Jessop 2012: 105). Jessop’s framework highlights the 
rise of certain modes of accumulation and the manner in which they came to dominate. 
It is able to conceive of how structures embed these ideas, such as Germany’s 
entrenchment of price stability over Europe’s other social-democratic orientations.  It is 
necessary to have a mechanism that is able to frame the role of accumulation and state 
projects since it accounts for the failure of governance due to the multiple objectives 
and incomplete nature of the Eurozone’s governance and economic structure  (Jessop, 
Brenner & Jones 2008: 395; Jessop 2003: 106). 
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1.4 Spatial Considerations 
 
The study of the Eurozone and its governance requires a framework that is able 
to conceive of a fluid conception of the state changing in time, existing outside 
traditional territorial considerations. The Eurozone’s governance involves both nation 
states, who are instrumental in the perpetuation of accumulation, but also supranational 
institutions also imperative in understanding the dominance of certain strategies (Jessop 
2012: 96). All of this is compounded with the ECB acting as a state institution without a 
polity, but nonetheless under Jessop’s framework it is a state institution. This spatial 
component means that capitalism’s accumulation strategy is capable of unfolding in 
varied ways due to the predilections of specific regions (Bruff 2012: 183-4). This thesis 
is dealing with nation states and other areas of governance not necessarily constrained 
by the typical “Westphalia” territorial obsession. Instead, territory acts as the realm of 
influence capital organises around, without being definitive (Jessop 2008: 136). It is 
merely a component of the way in which states construct their power, conceive of 
strategies and are able to execute their interests.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The SRA is a framework which is capable of both adapting to the changing state 
spaces composing the Eurozone and explaining the social reasoning behind the 
behaviour of its constituent agents’. Through this the SRA is capable of framing the 
systemic struggles of the Eurozone around the social and capitalist patterns inhibiting 
and advancing agents’ strategic interests. The theory’s unique ability to link agents and 
structure at a variety of levels, means that both state action and supra-state governance 
can be examined. The SRA places states’ actions at the centre and as this thesis will 
show, highlights the inadequacy of European state and collective governance to benefit 
the whole. From these foundations, the SRA provides the analytical tools to emphasis 
the role and motivations of states and also the interaction with the influence of capital. 
This influence is imperative for the examination of the European Central Bank and 
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understanding how selective ideology became dominant and the manner in which these 
strategic interests became systemically embedded. As this thesis will demonstrate the 
Strategic Relational Approach provides a framework to analyses the governance of the 
Eurozone in a manner that emphasises the interests of agents at that level but also the 
role of capital accumulation and pre-existing institutions and structures.   
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Chapter 2  
Making Change for a Euro: The Creation of the Formal 
Institutions of the Euro  
 
Introduction 	  
The governance of the Eurozone (Zone) is a multilayered inherently strategic 
process that has been heavily influenced by the economic context at the time 
immediately preceding and during its creation. The context surrounding the creation of 
the Eurozone acts as both an exemplar a of the strategic relationships involved and 
informs the future behaviour of member states.  This period solidified the ideology that 
became engrained within these governing structures, creating rigid institutions unable to 
adapt to changing circumstances. These rigidities were established through the founding 
Treaties that early on outlined the ideology of economic liberalisation and monetary and 
fiscal conservatism. These ideas were not only increasing in popularity in the late 20th 
Century as the Eurozone was being established, but were also being advanced by 
several strong economic member states who were necessary to creation of the Eurozone, 
particularly Germany. These power structures, and the somewhat economic irrelevant 
criteria placed around the Eurozone, have highlighted their strategic and political 
purpose, exposing the bias inherent in the multispeed economy that is the Eurozone. 
Overall, the creation of the Eurozone has revealed several divergent groups of member 
states, the Core (exemplified by Germany), and the Periphery of Mediterranean nations 
(exemplified by Greece). The Eurozone has struggled to balance national identity with a 
supranational collective good, to strike a balance between autonomy and accountability, 
and to centralize power across diffuse sovereign states.   
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2.1 History and Context of EMS 
 
In order to understand the Eurozone it is necessary to understand the political 
documents that established, perpetuated and govern it’s institutions. The Treaty of 
Rome (1958), the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the Stability and Growth Pact (1997), are 
expressions of the constituent strategic interests of the Eurozone as it became ever more 
integrated. These documents have all contributed to economic integration through a 
combination of competition and trade policy, the creation of the infrastructure and 
governing institutions of the Eurozone, and the impositions of fiscal constraint. 
 
2.1.1 Treaty of Rome- The First Step in Creating a Single Market 1958 
 
The Treaty of Rome (ToR) began the process of economic cooperation and 
political affiliation in 1958. The document was a representation of the desire for 
‘harmonious…economic activities’ through the creation of a common market (Snaith 
2014: 186). The common marketplace allowed for the free movement of goods, services 
and people of participating member states (European Commission 2014: 4). The Treaty 
had two major consequences: first, it began the process of economic expansion across 
Europe, with preferential trading and freedom of labour movement between the member 
states; secondly it began fostering a sense of European unity, which would allow 
Europe to be seen as a formidable force in the face of the United States and Soviet 
Union (Feldstein 1997: 70). (This sense of European identity was meant to be crucial 
component in the building of the Eurozone. However it has been poorly executed as 
member states continue to compete between and amongst each other, rather than acting 
for the good of Europe as a whole.) The movement of people would become an 
increasingly important mechanism to manage structural rigidities with the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), and in battling the systemic racism necessary to create a 
cohesive union. The Treaty of Rome outlined the foundations for European trade 
harmonisation, economic competition and began readying Europe for greater economic 
reform.   
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2.1.2 The Maastricht Treaty – Birth of the Eurozone, the Establishment and 
Cementing of Power Structures 
 
Greater economic reform came in the form of the creation of an Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) based on the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on the European 
Union/ Maastricht). The Maastricht Treaty was a major leap from the previous 20 years 
of merely trying to taper fluctuations between the member states (under the European 
Monetary Systems (EMS)). Maastricht involved the establishment of new institutions, a 
unified view on monetary policy and a ‘Convergence Criteria’ to ensure the stability 
and viability of the Eurozone. The Convergence Criteria outlined in Maastricht was the 
tripwire member states needed to comply with in order to enter into the final stage, 
Stage Three, of the EMU (Harrop 1998: 25). The Convergence Criteria included: price 
stability, an inflation rate of no more than 1.5% ; fiscal sustainability, a deficit no higher 
than 3% of GDP and a level of gross government debt to GDP ratio under 60% (these 
were caveated if there was satisfactory trajectories or exceptional temporal 
circumstances); exchange rate stability within the normal fluctuations of the ERM for 
two years without tension; finally, low interest rates ‘long term interest rate should not 
exceed by more that 2 % points the interest rates in …the three best performing 
countries in terms of price stability’ (Eiffinger & De Haan 2000: 28).   
 
The Maastricht Convergence Criteria was motivated by strategic political interests 
rather than a consistent economic argument (Mulhearn & Vane 2008: 49). In terms of 
economic logic the Convergence Criteria were not optimal, acting instead as a political 
precursor to Germany’s desire for an Ordoliberal infrastructure. Maastricht’s 
Convergence Criteria was interested in nominal economic convergence, ignoring to a 
large extent structural and asymmetric differences arising as part of the creation of the 
Zone (Sapir 2009: 264).1 Politically, the Maastricht Criteria were designed to create a 
low-inflation area with a stable common currency that mimicked Germany, but with 
greater market expansion (Eiffinger & De Haan 2000: 28). Economically, it is important 
to highlight that according to Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria, and the empirical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 There is a possibility that ignorance of structural asymmetric shocks was due to the line of reasoning that a common currency 
would sufficiently align intra-industry trade and that national banking shocks would be admonished due to the monetary union 
(Sapir 2009: 264). 
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data at the inception of the EMS in the 1990s, there was a definitive core (Germany, 
France, Austria, Denmark and the Benelux countries) whose adjustment speed to shocks 
was fast (Sapir 2009: 264). There was also a periphery (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
Spain, Finland, UK and Sweden) who suffer from both larger shocks and slower 
adjustment speeds (Sapir 2009: 264).  
 
The Maastricht Convergence Criteria (Criteria) proved to be a political bargaining 
mechanism, with more than half the member states admitted failing to satisfy at least 
one of the Criteria. The Criteria failed to inspire the monetary and fiscal conservatism 
they were designed to inspire due to the short time window they operated within 
(Mulhurn & Vane 2008: 49). This temporary nature has meant that many governments 
have deviated from these commitments once entering the EMU, thus accentuating the 
asymmetry and multispeed nature of the Zone. It became increasingly clear that the 
Convergence Criteria where not a way to align business cycles or synchronise crucial 
elements of government ideology, but were merely an initial threshold to limit the states 
eligible to partake in the EMU.  Whilst the ECB does have the ability to issue fines for 
budgetary non-compliance the ECB has failed to issue or enforce them (Sharma 2014: 
112). 
 
The Convergence Criteria and the Maastricht Treaty emphasise just how 
dominant and strategically significant Germany were to the Eurozone. Germany utilised 
Maastricht as an opportunity ensure the ongoing legacy of the Bundesbank and the 
strength of German economy. Germany occupied a unique position during the 
construction of Maastricht, having been the cornerstone and leading economy for much 
of the EMS in the lead up to the EMU (Thiel & Schroeder 1998: 117). It utilised this 
position in order to ensure the ECB was based on a blueprint of the German 
Bundesbank. Whilst theoretically possible for the rest of Europe and mainly for the 
French, Maastricht provided an opportunity to end the hegemony of the Bundesbank by 
starting afresh with a central bank detached from national loyalties (Scharpf 2015: 387). 
Germany however did not allow this to occur, with their involvement imperative and 
thus their influence inescapable. The Eurozone needed an anchoring economy in lieu of 
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a hesitant UK, making Germany strategically critically positioned to enforce their 
ideology (Mulhearn & Vane 2008: 80). 
 
That ideology was principally Ordoliberalism, viewing the role of the state as 
inherently connected to ‘protecting [the] capitalist economy ideationally and practically’ 
(Streeck 2015: 363). Whilst not desirable for the rest of the Eurozone, this ideology was 
forced to be palatable by the necessity of obtaining German backing for the Union. Its 
implementation was also aided of the increasing prevalence of neoliberalism in Europe. 
As a result the ECB as a state institution was equally subject to spatially layered and 
intertwined power processes including the ideational influence of neoliberalism 
(Brenner 2004: 81). These reasons ensured that as Germany surrendered economic 
sovereignty it guaranteed the perpetuation of its preferred ideology and ongoing 
strength of its position. Germany highlighted its strategic influence over the issue of 
price stability, by having Maastricht pass through their national constitutional court an 
order affirming that the “EMU was conceived of as Stabillitsgemeinschaft” in order for 
full ratification to occur (Thiel & Schroeder 1998: 115). This process acted as a political 
tool to demonstrate the importance of Germany in the European Single Market Project. 
The threat of Germany not entering the Union would have undermined the entire EMU, 
and this process emphasized the importance of the German agenda.  
 
Institutionally the Maastricht Treaty acted as an opportunity to reveal the actors 
and interests contributing to European monetary governance from this moment 
onwards. The Maastricht Treaty clearly positioned the ECB and the role of governance 
in ‘high politics’, that of states and technocrats and prevented community voices and 
real economic variables from affecting economic decision-making (Dyson & 
Fetherstone 1999: 15). The Treaty forced the exclusion of non-state actors through an 
explicit non-consultative Article (Article 107)2 (Mulhearn & Vane 2008: 97). This 
Article guarantees that the ECB operates on a rigid ideological, German outlook on 
central banking, un-impinged by community concerns. This strategic positioning meant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Article 107 of Maastricht Treaty: ‘When exercising their powers, carrying out their tasks and duties 
neither the ECB nor National Central Banks nor any other member of the decision making bodies shall 
seek or take instructions from community institutions or bodies from any government of a member state 
or any other body’ (Mulhearn & Vane 2008: 97) 
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that once the dominant group of member states had been established its voice and 
interests, it was effectively amplified by controlling the agenda and limiting the number 
of other issues that could be contributed.  
 
2.1.3 Stability and Growth Pact- Fiscal Governance of the Eurozone  
 
Maastricht was reinforced with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP or Pact) in 
1997, expanding upon the fiscal conditions applied on member states. The Pact was 
meant to reinforce growth desirable fiscal behaviour and growth patterns, including 
preventative, corrective and deterrent elements (Issing 2008: 197)3. It focused on deficit 
ceilings and government debt, and had the power to impose sanctions. However this 
Pact was composed of almost entirely ‘soft laws,’ with powerful member states such as 
Germany and France unabashedly violating the Pact and halting the European 
Commission from issuing punishment (Issing 2008: 199). The member states with the 
largest economic activity were not only most likely to violate this Pact, but almost 
unpunishable, with any sanction risking the entire Eurozone’s growth (Hanson 2015: 8). 
This positioning has allowed these dominant members to not only violate the Pact but to 
also maintain judgement on other transgressors, influence policy decisions and create 
divergences in fiscal policy throughout the Eurozone (Issing 2008: 199).  The SGP did 
little to curb ‘poor’ fiscal management by either large or small member states. Instead, it 
highlighted the exploitative and uneven relationship the Core had with the Periphery. 
 
The documents discussed above are central to the analysing the rigidity of the 
ECB as they highlight multilevel governance of the Eurozone, rather than viewing the 
Eurozone as a supranational state (Jessop 2006: 141). The Eurozone’s member states 
acted in a manner that was designed to guarantee their interests, and they focused on 
their national economies. The formal documents and structures of the Eurozone act as 
the foundation of capitalist reproduction through the promotion of institutionalised 
‘multi-scalar meta-governances’ in favour of open markets, with hierarchical networks 
to improve outcomes for select member states (Jessop 2006: 153). The strong states 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Otmar Issing is a German Economist, former Bundesbank Board Member and a founding member of the 
Executive Board of the ECB from 1998-2006 
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were strategically utilising their influence in order to protect their economies by 
ingraining favourable ideology that favoured their method of accumulation.  
 
The Core member states therefore used this opportunity in order to ensure that 
their accumulation strategy was perpetuated, no matter the cost. This accumulation 
strategy required a strong focus on inflation targeting, an emphasis on fiscal 
conservatism and advanced opportunities for their economy. This strategy was 
inherently in their favour as it allowed for expansive access to markets with a 
favourable export exchange rate, and Germany’s economy was already prepared for this 
style of liberalism as will come to be seen in Chapter 3. This idea has allowed for the 
promotion of the capitalist hierarchy and an investment in a Schumpeterian 
constructions of capitalism, as competitive integration, innovation and enterprise push 
for a neoliberal orientation (Jessop 2006: 148). Ultimately, however, these strategies 
would come to weaken the Zone as a whole, with asymmetric accumulation and 
economically incoherent policy creating risks for the interdependent European 
economy.  
 
2.2 German Central Banking Ideology  
 
The ECB is governed by a mentality of New Consensus demand-side economics 
supplemented by German central banking traditions. So what makes German central 
banking unique? German central banking’s philosophy forces price stability to be the 
principle aim, and only once accomplished may other traditional ‘Anglo-Saxon central 
banking’ aims, such as unemployment rates, be considered (De Grauwe 2005: 166). In 
order for this singular anti-inflationary aim to be achieved the European Central Bank 
needed to be politically unbiased towards any one nation. Accordingly this philosophy 
provided the basis for justifying the ECB’s unprecedented independence (Palley 2011: 
7). This independence is unique. Whilst many countries have a central bank 
independent from politics (e.g the Reserve Bank of Australia) almost all central banks 
are accountable and subject to parliamentary mandates and act as their government’s 
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banker 4(see section 2.3.). However, the ECB’s unprecedented independence is derived 
from a few key elements in the Maastricht treaty including: the non-consultative 
articles, prohibiting government or community groups from interfering or influencing 
the ECB; the non-disclosure of voting records; the inability to alter the ‘instrumental 
aims’ of the ECB without ratification by all signatory states of the EU (not just the 
Eurozone); and finally the inability of the ECB to finance the debt of individual member 
states (Mulhearn & Vane 2008: 97; Schroeder 2003: 210).  
 
This structuring was able to succeed due to the belief that no member state should 
be able to exert its will over the rest of the EMU, and the increasing prevalence of New 
Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) ideas in central banking. Germany used the 
increasing prevalence of New Consensus Macroeconomics that had been on the rise 
since the 1980s, to justify its demands (Arestis 2009: 3). NCM makes price stability as 
its aim, with monetary policy (namely the interest rate) as the only way to control it. 
NCM was compatible with Germany’s aims, and also placed central bank independence 
in line with German fears for hyperinflation and the political manipulation of the ECB 
(Arestis 2009: 3). The need for political independence came from the assumption that 
politicians could manipulate monetary policy to affect elections through the adjustment 
of short-run inflation preferences (Baimbridge 2005: 78). This desire has resulted in a 
‘democratic deficit,’ as important national and community stakeholders were excluded 
from the conversation or holding the ECB accountable (Talani 2005: 204). The Bank 
exists as an institution infatuated with maintaining monetary variables, yet it is 
conceivable that it lost touch with real economic indicators (such as growth and 
unemployment rates) due to its unaccountable relationship from Europe.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 ECB President can be called to appear before the European Parliament but unlike US Federal Reserve or 
other central banks they are able to disregard opinions of elected represents without recourse due to the 
unanimity required to alter the Banks mandate (De Grauwe 2005:178) 
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2.2.1 Autonomy and Accountability 
  
The creation of the ECB resulted in a new institution with unprecedented 
autonomy and unaccountability, with an inherent bias towards the accumulation 
interests of particular member states. The ECB has a unique lack of accountability and 
transparency due it being an assumed requirement to ensure that its decisions are based 
on European not national interests. In this vein, the Bank has withdrawn itself from 
interaction with or input from local communities and national stakeholders through 
application of Article 107/8 of the Maastricht Treaty, the a ‘non-consultative’ or ‘non-
interference’ principle (Schroeder 2003: 210). It is assumed that this withdrawn nature 
enables the Executive Board of the ECB to make decisions without fear of retribution or 
national bias. This assumption that detachment from any real world influence would 
allow the Bank to exist as a superior technocratic institution has instead exposed the 
undemocratic and unaccountable nature of the ECB. However the Bank is not truly 
detached, with its policies and implementation exhibiting ‘greater cognisance’ of Core 
influential member states over than the Mediterranean Periphery (Lapavistas 2012: 3).   
 
This principle is compounded by the inability for Executive Board members to be 
held accountable to any national parliament for their collective decisions (Mulhearn & 
Vane 2008: 97). Whilst the Bank is theoretically accountable to the European 
Parliament (EP), and can be called before it to explain decisions or give forecasts the 
Bank maintains ‘instrumental independence’ about how to accomplish aims, making 
them tautologically justified (De Grauwe 2005: 179). The ‘democratically elected’ 
European Parliament also has no discretionary disciplinary power over the ECB, with 
no power of veto over decisions and Governors of the Bank being nationally appointed 
on long-term contracts. This is compounded by the fact that all voting records are kept 
confidential (Article 10.4 of Maastricht) to ensure that voting in line with national 
preferences against the interest of the European community does not occur (Mulhearn & 
Vane 2008: 97-8). This veil of distance that the Bank has pursued was premised on the 
idea that a European identity would emerge from monetary unity concurrently as 
economic forces push towards the synchronisation of business cycles and employment. 
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This distance however failed to produce a superior technocratic, governance institution 
or a harmonious Eurozone as will be seen in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2.2 Economic ideology 
 
The ideology underpinning the governance of the Eurozone is a result of the 
economic climate and powerful economic agents immediately preceding its creation. 
The 1970s and 1980s represented a shift in global economic ideology as the world 
adapted to the failures of Keynesianism and Stagflation, and economic powers (such as 
Germany) continued to reinforce their success (Fitoussi & Saraceno 2013: 483). In 
response to a changing economic climate new discussion began and focused on 
lowering inflation and aligning economies. As a consequence the European Monetary 
System was created. This was an attempt to align the most economically powerful 
nations in Europe by ensuring the Deutschmark (DM) did not appreciate too much in 
value, whilst simultaneously providing France with domestic political coverage 
surrounding its tightening of their monetary policy and bringing exchange rates back in 
line (Harrop 1998: 24).  
 
The consequence of lowering inflation rates for Peripheral member states tended 
to be high short-term unemployment rates. However these states were operating under 
an assumption that in the long run there is no trade-off between unemployment and 
inflation and they therefore complied (Harrop 1998: 24). These activities were enacted 
simultaneously to the EMS’s enforcement of an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
[Snake in the Tunnel for interest rates5] in order to encourage convergence as Europe 
headed towards an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). For the Peripheral member 
states this had a two-pronged effect: unemployment rose, as the deflationary preference 
was enforced; whilst the most vulnerable nations were unable to adjust exchange rates 
in order to enhance their international competitiveness with devaluation (Lucarelli 
2011: 211). This ultimately resulted in structural imbalances, as strong economies such 
as Germany, were able to use ‘wage discipline’ to increase price competitiveness on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ‘Snake in the Tunnel’ was the terminology used to describe the approximately 4.5% window relational 
to each other each currency had to maintain.  
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global scale at the expense of the Periphery (wage discipline will be returned to in 
Chapter 3) (Issing 2011: 741). [This allowed the French to implement their deflationary 
policies, but was proven to be insufficient, causing increasing political backlash in 1995 
from the French public. However at this point the EMU was firmly established and the 
French government had insufficient power to alter economic policy (Reland 1998: 85).]  
 
The ECB’s modus operandi since its inception is that of the New Consensus 
Macroeconomics, a school of thought arising from the domination of monetary policy 
over fiscal policy (Fontana 2006: 441). Under the New Consensus, price stability is the 
prevailing indicator central banks utilise. This indicator is adjusted according to the 
nominal interest rate increases in response to expected inflation to increase the short 
term real interest rate, affecting aggregate demand and re-aligning inflation (inflation 
rate of around 2% is considered stable) (Fontana 2006: 441). It must be remembered 
that Europe operated under a quasi central bank since the 1980s, the Bundesbank, whom 
Modigliani characterised as having an ‘obsessive fear of inflation and a benign neglect 
for unemployment’ (Fontana 2006: 443). This view was able to persist as the New 
Consensus promotes a Classical view that monetary policy only produces real effects in 
the short run. According to Modigliani, this view has allowed for the level of aggregate 
demand and employment across Europe to be severely negatively affected (Fontana 
2006: 443).  
 
These views were able to dominate as a subset of the neoclassical paradigm that 
was simultaneously influencing banking and economic governance (including the US 
Federal Reserve) espousing similar beliefs of: rational agents; market’s efficient 
allocation of resources; the (mostly) ineffective intervention of governments; monetary 
conservatism; and the universality of these principles (Fitoussi & Saraceno 2013: 484). 
The prevalence of these views in both New Keynesian and New Classicals made it 
strategically easier to implement these aims, feeding off the neoliberal ideology. These 
principles aligned with many components of Germany’s economic outlook and practice. 
Germany’s belief in these principles makes sense, as it allows for a strong German 
export market, it plays to their fear of hyperinflation since the War, and, as the 
anchoring bank they had increased credibility in implementing their Ordoliberals 
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ideology across the Eurozone as a whole (Lucarelli 2011: 211; Schroeder 2003: 211; 
Bibow 2013: 109, 611-12). Against the backdrop of globally failing Keynesian central 
banking practice, which viewed central banks as an organ of the state that should be 
inherently accountable and invested in real outcomes, the Eurozone had almost no 
choice but to structurally embed these new ideas into the ideological fabric of the ECB 
(Bibow 2013: 109, 611-12). 
 
2.3 The structure of the ESCB 
 
The strategic forces and global pressures throughout the late 20th Century 
therefore resulted in a complex structure of the European System of Central Banking 
(ESCB).  The ESCB is a body of institutions with the ECB situated at the head. As such 
the ECB maintains a high degree of centralised power, however it is heavily reliant on 
the National Central Banks (NCB) of member states for dissemination of decisions and 
the relaying and collection of information (Padoa-Schioppa 2004: 24)6. Historically 
central banks have been responsible for supervision of commercial banks to ensure 
informational validity when making decisions (Padoa-Schioppa 2004: 22-3). However 
the ECB, contrary to its immense power and independence, is reliant upon NCBs for 
prudential supervision retaining only a weak supervisory function (Skaperdas 2011: 14). 
This leaves the ECB reliant on the trustworthiness of Eurozone member state’s NCBs 
for the information that contributes to their economic decision making and modelling, 
such as expected inflation and GDP (Gorter, Jacobs & de Haan 2008: 478). This 
information is discretionary and politically volatile, as member states have agreed to 
both the Stability and Growth Pactand the Maastricht Treaty, which carry penalties for 
violations of deficits and public debt (Hertzog & Hengstermann 2013: 3). This 
supervisory and informant based role is one of the few features the subsidiary, NCBs 
have maintained under the hegemonic influence of the ECB (Padoa-Schioppa 2004: 22-
4). A subset of this structure is the idea of decentralisation, the subsidiary nature of the 
NCB within the ESCB. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Padoa-Schioppa was an Italian Economist and considered on of the founding fathers of the Eurozone he 
was an Executive Board Member of the ECB from 1998-2005 
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 Structurally therefore, the Eurozone acts as its own ‘polity’, where the Zone acts 
like a country but with member states reduced to a role similar to corporations, 
influenced by strategic and competitive motivations but systemically constrained by the 
governing control and coordination of Eurozone’s Single Market Program (Padoa-
Schioppa 2004: 35, 49). A certain degree of concession to market by the state has not 
been uncommon throughout the 21st Century, as geographical boundaries become 
increasingly irrelevant under the pressure of commercial institutions (Goodhart & 
Tsomoscos 2012a: 455). This phenomenon is exacerbated in the Eurozone by the 
interdependence of all nations; both commercial banks and enterprise can exert undue 
influence on markets as there is no reliable supervisory functions. Supervisory data has 
been proven to enhance economic forecasting, and when well executed at both micro 
and macro level can dramatically influence the ability for effective crisis management 
(Goodhart & Tsomoscos 2012a: 468-9). The Eurozone has failed to properly emphasise 
and execute this crucial role, with the role of central bank supervision still under 
discussion, but decentralised reporting functions delegated to the NCBs and sovereign 
powers increasingly unwilling to relinquish any more politically valuable autonomy to 
the ECB (Goodhart & Tsomoscos 2012a: 459; Goodhart & Tsomoscos 2012b: 129). 
 
The structures that govern the Eurozone are rigid to such a degree that on a 
national and supernational level strategic influence and adaptability is heavily obscured. 
The Governing Council and the General Council are largely composed of Governors of 
NCBs of Eurozone and EU nations (Eijffinger & De Haan 2000: 33). Within this 
structure there is an expectation that NCB Governors will be detached from their 
national identity, with each vote given equal weighting, with a ‘one person one vote’ 
mentality (Thiel & Schroeder 1998: 111-2). This is an extension of the idea that a 
European identity exists and that a collective good for all European nations is possible 
in making monetary decisions. However both the level of unaccountability and the 
politically charged nature of the ECB’s role has left it more vulnerable to 
mismanagement than unbiased, technocratic governance. The second function that 
central banks have historically performed is a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR), a function 
the ECB has condemned by diminishing NCBs’ ability to create money (without 
excessive bond returns), and prohibiting the financing of public debt of any member 
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state (see Maastricht (Article 21.1) and Amsterdam Treaties) (Goodhart and Tsomoscos 
2012a: 456; Palley 2011: 7; Lucarelli 2011: 211).  
 
The LOLR function of the central bank was disregarded in the context of the ECB 
due to a fear of irresponsible member states would ‘free-ride,’- expecting fiscally 
responsible member states to finance their debt.  As a consequence there has been a lack 
of critical thought into other necessary strategies to help manage public debt, or control 
external shocks that may result in contagion and spill over (Eltis 2000: 53).  As the ECB 
is ill-equipped to handle or compensate for national issues it has resulted in ‘haphazard’ 
institutions being established such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
(See Chapter 4) (Gocaj, Ledina & Meunier 2013: 240). The absence of this crucial 
function highlights the impotence of member governments over their financial stability. 
The ECB failed to not only anticipate the concept of a crisis but failed to create a 
politically accountable authority capable creating a harmonious economy to govern. 
This is especially important as the Eurozone entered the 21st Century, with increased 
speculative finance and personal exposure highlighting the lack of recourse member 
states and the ECB had in the case of a crisis.   
 
Conclusion  	  
The Eurozone’s infrastructure was able to be established as a rigid and poorly 
structured institution facilitating the exacerbation of an uncohesive and vulnerable 
collective economy. The Zone was not established to be balanced or economically 
coherent, and as a consequence it must be seen as a political and strategic endeavour. As 
previous Executive Board Member of the ECB Padao Schioppa stated: ‘the European 
Union is an eminently political construct. Even readers primarily interested in 
economics would hardly understand the euro if they ignored its political dimension’ 
(Krampf 2015: 183). This political nature however has left weaknesses which were 
exploited by powerful member states, as will be seen. But this political construction 
deprived the Eurozone of much of the foundational unity it was aspiring to and has 
made its institutions deficient at governing in the interest of the whole. The ECB was 
not given enough power to effectively govern and unite the Eurozone, acting as a partial 
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state, and as member states were deprived of their autonomy competition rather than 
collective interest became the dominant force. The various constitutional Treaties and 
the history of Europe merely acted as a new strategic space for the Core nations to 
establish and cement their dominance at the expense of both the Periphery and 
eventually the Eurozone as a whole.  
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Chapter 3  
Waging War and Zoning Out: Understanding Asymmetry 
across the Zone 	  
Introduction 
 
The creation of the ECB and accompanying institutions failed to establish a 
governable holistic economy. The ECB’s lack of oversight and intervention allowed for 
asymmetry to be exacerbated across the Eurozone, and as a consequence benefits of the 
joint currency unequally distributed. This was able to occur through a lack of active 
harmonisation under the illusion that the Zone would naturally equilibrate. This lack of 
governance however provided strategic opportunities for national governments to 
implement policies for their own advantage. This resulted in member states competing 
with and destabilising each other, weakening the position of the Zone as a whole. 
Theoretically, the Eurozone was designed to create a strong economy that would not 
only harmonise Europe but also challenge the domination of other currencies. Instead it 
has resulted in internally competitive industrial relations between member states, 
financial mismanagement and a collective economy that was unsustainable under its 
governance infrastructure. This chapter will explore the rationale behind the Eurozone’s 
lack of active integration, and how this lack of active governance allowed select 
member states to utilise policies to increase their competitiveness. It is important to 
emphasise that the Eurozone economies are diverse and thus not all are able to 
implement the same policies and for those policies to have the same affect. Finally this 
chapter will acknowledge the changing context of the Eurozone, as its first decade saw 
an increasing role of debt and finance and how this asymmetrically impacted upon 
member states without adequate supervision.  
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3.1.1 Theory 1: Endogenous Currency Areas 
 
The Eurozone’s institutions, the ECB and European Commission, unfounded faith 
in the Endogenous Currency Area Theory (ECA), resulted in a lack of supra-state 
governance positioning member states to be able to strategically benefit from the lack of 
oversight. The ECA, also known as the ‘self-validating currency area’ theory, claimed 
that the introduction of a single currency would naturally induce integration and the 
harmonisation of the member state’s economies, following the creation of the EMU 
(Silvia 2004: 150-1). Under this logic7, since intra-industry trade dominates in the 
developed world, member states’ economies would increase trade causing greater 
synchronising of business cycles (this can also occur with equally diversified 
economies) and making all national economies equally vulnerable to external shocks 
(Schelke 2013: 40). This passive theory provided a rationale that allowed the 
Eurozone’s institutions, such as the ECB, the solitary role of monitoring the economy. 
The theory effectively created a complacent attitude to economic governance at a 
supranational level, providing member states with an the opportunity to exploit their 
advantage by engaging in competitive policies. It provided national governments and 
institutions with the strategic space to position themselves (and not the Eurozone) in the 
global economy. It is due to this strategic space that member state’s national 
governments did not harmonise as the ECA hypothesised.  
 
3.1.2 Theory 2: Krugman’s Alternative Theory 
 
Paul Krugman’s interpretation of asymmetric integration, the ‘Specialization 
Hypothesis,’ provided a significantly more accurate account. Krugman’s Specialization 
Hypothesis argues that a single currency would result in ‘greater geographical 
specialisation since it promotes greater economies of scale and reduces costs to trade’ 
(Silvia 2004: 150). Geographically, Krugman highlights that whilst trade may increase, 
this trade would not have to be reciprocal or symmetrical, therefore allowing for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Which is an extension of Rose and Frankel Optimum Currency Area explanation (Frankle & Rose 
1996:1-2) 
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reaping of asymmetric benefits across the Zone.  In strategic terms this initially meant 
that in the single market process there existed an opportunity to heighten productivity to 
ensure that specific national economies had a competitive advantage. From this vantage 
point not only is the Eurozone destined to be sub-optimal, but specific regional and 
national specialisation makes asymmetric shocks across the Zone, more probable 
(Schelkle 2013: 40). Under Krugman’s framework certain regions of the Eurozone and 
groups of member states would suffer from a reduction in correlation in regional 
incomes with the rest of the Zone together with an  increase in trade asymmetry (Silvia 
2004: 150).  
 
This asymmetry in trade is compounded by Myrdal’s Development Economics 
perspective that once a competitive advantage is achieved it will be accentuated. 
Myrdal’s hypothesis puts forward the view that:  
 
‘the free circulation of capital leads to polarisation through a process which is 
cumulative in character due to the fact that the entry of capital in a country at a 
higher marginal productivity leads to new actives that in turn create new 
opportunities [for] attracting new capital.’ (Bianchi 1998: 22)  
 
In the context of the Eurozone this meant that the early years following its 
establishment provided a space for individual members states to attempt to advance 
their productivity and competitiveness in a concerted effort to attract long term capital. 
As a result, those member states that failed to appropriately orient their economies or to 
increase productivity and competitiveness preceding entry into the EMU or during its 
early establishment risked suffering a prolonged period and environment in which they 
had no advantage.  
 
3.2 How Did this Disparity Occur? 
 
Whilst the ECB and its associated institutions (European Commission) did 
monitor productivity, employment and wage rates, entrepreneurship and investment, all 
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economic reforms were focused at a national level. This allowed national governments 
to be able to focus on their domestic economy and global positioning, ignoring the 
implications for the Eurozone as a whole. This is especially true in areas such as labour 
relations, where domestic policy and market structures can significantly differ in 
outcomes and minimum standards. These policies left some parts of the European 
economy more vulnerable, volatile and, much as Krugman feared, subject to regional 
ghettoization and polarisation of investment for productive industry.  
 
3.2.1 The Importance of Labour  
 
Labour plays a seminal role in the unification of the Eurozone by creating 
harmony across Europe and in synchronising economies. However it was left out of the 
purview of the ECB and thus left to national level governance.  The Treaties that 
enacted the EMU laid out the practical explanations for the Zone, and highlighted the 
goal of a subsequent political and social union, reinforcing the interests of a more 
peaceful Europe in the wake of WWII (Feldstein 1997: 61; Tsoukalis, Hill & Smith 
2005: 234). Whilst this political union failed to materialize, the necessity for labour to 
be the adjustment mechanism to equilibrate European the economy remained.  
 
How was labour meant to equilibrate the economy? Labour mobility and wages 
(as a form of prices) were expected to compensate for the loss of the nominal exchange 
rate mechanism between Eurozone member states (Baltho 1998: 144). In principle this 
meant that when, for example Germany, becomes more productive and growth occurs 
meaning it requires more labour, real wages will rise and goods will become more 
expensive. Simultaneously in a Peripheral member state there is unemployment so 
wages will fall and products will become cheaper (Eijffinger & de Haan 2000:19). This 
mentality however is predicated on the assumption that member states are ‘rational 
wage setters’ meaning ‘wages are set so as to deliver the real exchange rate consistent 
with the economy at equilibrium output and with inflation at the …[Common Currency 
Area] inflation target’ (Carlin 2013: 490). If these conditions are not met, persistent 
inflation can occur, the real interest rate can become a destabilizing source of 
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information, loose credit conditions can occur creating divergent current account 
balances and real exchange rates, creating even greater volatility (Carlin 2013: 490). In 
terms of macro economic policy, rational wage setting was not enforced at a supra-state 
level. Due to this, price signals failed to be a meaningful indicator or to aid the 
synchronizing and converging of national economies to diminish the risk of asymmetric 
shocks (Issing & Smith 2004: 25).  
 
3.2.2 Use of Wage Suppression 
 
The lack of concession of sovereignty to EU institutions around industrial 
relations provided national governments with a short temporal window to cement their 
competitive advantage in order to maximise their benefits from the Euro. In order to 
improve their competitive positions, the Core economies had to implement strategically 
selective policies that would suppress wage growth, outsource underproductive sectors 
and attract productive capital in order to expand markets available to them.  
 
The use of an effective wage suppression policy (wage moderation) enabled select 
collections of member states to increase their competitiveness at the expense of other 
member states. Many of the northern economies, particularly Germany, entered the 
EMU at an uncompetitive exchange rate. However they had already begun the process 
of decentralizing wage bargaining, resulting in greater firm flexibility with regards to 
employment conditions and labour market restructuring (Rhodes 2014: 656). These 
policies, which existed in several of the northern Core economies, enabled the 
coordination of nominal wage growth so that it could not grow at an uncompetitive 
level in important tradable industries in order to maintain control of competitiveness 
(Carlin 2011: 326).  
 
The Core countries that committed to these policies were able to do so as their 
wage level growth was tethered to more sheltered sectors, and were thus less vulnerable 
to speculative pressures (Johnston, Hancke & Pant 2014: 1772). These policies however 
come at an expense; whilst Germany’s national economy grew it resulted in a real wage 
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devaluation for German workers (Young & Semmler 2011: 2). In reducing the cost of 
labour Germany was able to be more competitive and productive, but at the expense of 
its workers. However it was only able to execute this strategic policy due to its pre-
established position within the global economy as an exporter.8  This valorisation 
process in favour of the Cores’ capitalism is an extension of capital’s domination and 
control of the states’ extra-economic coercive force in its domestic favour (Jessop 1983: 
90).  
 
In contrast, the Periphery’s national governments were unable to engage in this 
strategic devaluation of labour, due to both financial markets and their reliance on 
internal domestic markets. The Periphery had less structured economies, with less 
control over wage rates and a much greater reliance on their domestic market, which 
would have been stifled if domestic demand were depressed by decreasing the value of 
wages (Grahl & Teague 2013: 688). Instead, joining the Eurozone acted for much of the 
Periphery as an incentive for speculative capital and credit based consumption. This 
speculative and personal debt based spending in turn produced a consumption boom, 
forcing prices (including wages) to rise, but with all of the gain being readily reversible 
(See Figure 1 and 2) (Grahl & Teague 2013: 688). This high demand in the Periphery 
however was a distortion of the market, and served to reinforce the Periphery’s 
historically poor productivity (Rhodes 2014: 657). Figures 1 and 2 clearly display how 
Germany was able to give the illusion of increasing productivity whilst maintaining a 
strong export sector. In contrast the rest of the Eurozone (and Greece in particular) 
experienced heightened labour costs and were thus a less competitive economy. Figures 
1 and 2 depict the dramatic divergence in wage rate throughout the first decade of the 
Euro. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The Core has only approximately 50% of its trade from internal EU trade compared to the Periphery 
which is reliant on the EU market for up to 70%. (Thiel  & Schroeder 1998: 106) 
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Figure 1: Labour costs across the Euro area from 2000-2012  
Unit Labour Costs 2000=100.00 
Source: OECD (2012)  
 
Labour Costs in the Euro Area, Germany and Greece between 2000-2012 
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Nominal	  Labour	  Costs	  in	  Europe	  from	  1995	  -­‐2008	  
Figure	  2:	  Nominal Labour Cost 1995=100	  
Sources: Lapavistas (2010: 338) 
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3.3 The Structure of the Eurozone Economy  
 
The European economy suffered after the establishment of the Treaties and the 
failures of its governing bodies to reorientate Eurozone members to behave as a single 
economy. This lack of behavioural unity and holistic governance allowed for powerful 
member state’s governments to position themselves within the global economy and 
steer the European economy by proxy. Whilst there is a common interest in a strong 
European economy, there is no institutionally accepted monopoly over coercive power. 
This allows for individual member states to exert their self interest such that multi-
scalar governance becomes too great an effort to coordinate various stakeholders in 
order to have a complimentary means of governance, rather than one policy that is good 
for all (Jessop 2004: 50-51). In this sense the Eurozone economy has been able to be 
strategically dominated by the Core member states with a strong and embedded interest 
in protecting their domestic capital.  
 
3.4.1 Varieties of Capitalism 
 
Due to a vacuum in centralised power the Core member states have been able to 
strategically situate their economies in a global context, answering to its domestic 
interest for capital and increasing its own power. As stated previously, the Germans 
have only been able to utilise wage devaluation because of their economy’s outward 
focus. In this time Germany and France were also able to secure conditions to 
enhance the productive components of their economy. For the French the depreciated 
value of the Euro in the early years provided a time envelope for advancing their 
manufacturing sectors export sector (Talani 2005: 224). This positioning would aid 
them in the years to come by progressing their markets. The German government 
exerted a similar, if not greater, effort to ensure their manufacturing and production 
sector were globally competitive in the context of the global economy (especially 
exploiting the large market opened by oil producing nations in the Middle East) 
(Rhodes 2014: 656; Talani 2005: 224). The German economy, accompanied by the 
Netherlands and Austria, was only able to sustain a thriving export sector (growing at 
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twice the speed of the rest of the Eurozone 1996-2008) and current account surpluses 
by creating imbalances that necessitated current account deficits in the Periphery 
(Young & Semmler 2011: 2, 10). These self-interested policies were able to be 
executed by powerful states, in the interest of capital, due to a vacuum left 
ungoverned and uncoordinated at a European level, and because of the economic 
structures which enabled this to be an option.  
 
3.3.2 Firms, Enterprises and the -temporal fix of harmonisation 
 
States in Europe are inherently influenced by a desire to protect and advance their 
domestic firms. The Treaties, particularly the Treaty of Rome, were constructed in such 
a fashion that the opening of borders was beneficial to firms that had established 
efficient economies of scale. The Core member states (France and Germany) 
statistically have a larger average firm size, than the Mediterranean Periphery (Mulhern 
1995: 83-4). These Core firms were also strategically well positioned in the 1980s 
neoliberal era9, leading up to the EMU, with a large export focus making them 
significantly more competitive than those in the Periphery (Bruff  2010: 626; 
Maccartney 2011: 34-5). The Mediterranean region on the other hand is largely 
populated with small size firms, with two thirds of Greece’s firms considered ‘micro-
firms,’10 leaving them more vulnerable to competition and inefficiency (Mulhern 1995: 
83-4). During this period these Mediterranean firms with lower trade barriers for 
protection, were now facing increased competition together with and an environment 
with penalising borrowing rates due to their lack of collateral and significantly less 
productive labour (by up to 66%) (Mulhern 1995: 84). In essence this made the 
Mediterranean economies more reliant on internal and credit based markets, as their 
competitiveness in export markets was so low. This allowed the Core member states 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Jessop (2013: 71) definition of neoliberalism: ‘six defining economic policies of the neoliberal political 
project are likely to be adopted in such cases: liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, market proxies in 
the residual public sector, a commitment to further internationalisation and reductions in direct taxation.’   
10 Definition of micro firms:‘Small firms are generally those with fewer than 50 employees, while micro-
enterprises have at most 10, or in some cases 5, workers… (SMEs) are non-subsidiary, independent firms 
which employ fewer than a given number of employees. This number varies across countries. The most 
frequent upper limit designating an SME is 250 employees, as in the European Union”(OECD glossary 
2015) 
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increased access to external markets, stronger economies and as a result produced 
greater regional inequalities (Macartney  2011: 34-5). This necessity for credit can be 
seen in Figure 3, using household financial assets (as a proxy for household debt), the 
divergence between the Core and the Periphery is evident. The same relationship is true 
for business as seen in Figure 4 with private debt.  
 
Since the EMU’s inception the Core has also elongated the timeframe and 
geographical reach of its corporate domination through the establishment of regulatory 
frameworks that strategically limit the influence of other actors.  Since economic 
governance was not wholly conceded by the states to the EU institutions, Core firms 
have been able to position themselves through careful regulation at both a state and 
supra-state level in order to increase their advantage. This has mostly been achieved 
through strategic, first-mover advantages in regulatory settings, negative integration (the 
removal of barriers) and selective subsidy protection. First, on a regulatory basis 
(Germany and France) have used their technocratic dominance to propose and set 
European standards. These standards-setting strategies are only available due to their 
already formidable position in the global economy limiting any future impediments to 
their growth (Avdagic 2001: 144-5). This corporate domination is reinforced by those 
states able to support business, protecting weaker sectors, such as Germany gaining 
unchallenged subsidies in their favour (Art 2015: 198). Under this form, Germany has 
embedded a series of rules and norms over how and where capital is drawn, despite the 
counterproductive effect these rules may have on the rest of the Eurozone, especially 
the Periphery (Jessop 2013: 8).   
 
This form of  ‘regulation-cum-governance’ has aided the Core’s capital 
accumulation, but has ultimately derailed harmonisation efforts and created greater 
polarization. The Core has been able to utilise their strategic position in order to instil 
norms which will continue to favour their economic growth, as seen above through their 
business behaviour and as will be explained with their roles in finance capital (Jessop 
2013: 9-11). Structures have been created and implemented where it advances the Core, 
and at the same time, barriers are only revoked in the interests of the Core. In the 
context of Europe, this form of accumulation strategy has been inherently biased, but 
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has also resulted in the need for a spatio-temporal fix. Spatio-temporal fixes act as a 
compromise where the time frame shifts, allowing for institutional imbalances and 
compromises to exist within the accumulation regime and governance (Jessop 2005: 
51). Under this premise the dominant class acts in a manner which is not necessarily 
congruous with their interests in a given area or time, but in perspective the compromise 
can be seen to be in their long-term or short term advantage (Jessop 2000: 331).  By 
embedding these structures capitalism ultimately served to weaken the Zone and its 
institutional integrity, and the spatial areas available to exploitation.  
 
 
3.4 Financial Markets’ Role in the Economy 
 
The Eurozone’s creation coincided with a heightened prevalence of speculative 
finance. For many countries the unification of the Eurozone made them much more 
attractive and easy to invest in for speculative finance. The creation of the Euro, as 
stated previously led to inflationary divergences and a narrowing of real interest rate 
differentials, providing a fruitful environment for ‘bubbles’ to occur, such as the 
housing bubbles in Spain, Ireland and Greece (Lucarelli 2011: 207).  The low interest 
rates allowed for artificially easy borrowing for a lot of households in the Periphery 
giving them increased personalised debt (See Figure 3). This was in conjunction with 
mass financialisation that was occurring in mature economies around the world, where 
finance increases in importance comparative to productive components of the economy 
(Lapavistas et al. 2010: 321). This process also included commercial banks beginning to 
target households instead of corporations, who can self-finance (see Figure 4).  This 
relationship can be seen through the amount of household financial assets (aside from 
shares) each are holding (Lapavistas et al. 2010: 322). Whilst financialisation has 
occurred across the Eurozone, Germany and the Core avoided much of the personal 
volatility associated with increasing household debt and speculative bubbles such as real 
estate (Lapavistas et al. 2010: 322). This increasing personal and private sector debt 
acted as a compounding and unequal burden falling on the Periphery due to the 
structure of their economies. 
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Private Sector Debt, Consolidated- Percentage (%) of Gross 
Domestic Product  
Figure 4: Private sector debt to % GDP 
Source: Europa (2015) 
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3.5.1 The Role of Finance and Debt  
 
The Core was also able to utilise the new sovereign subservience to the bond 
market to consolidate their advantage.  Most of the Periphery’s credit was drawn from 
external sources. External debt is the only form of debt available for most Eurozone 
states as they do not have control over monetary policy or the quantity of money. This 
debt is also the most volatile as interest involves ‘drainage out of the domestic income 
stream,’ placing increased pressure on the aggregate domestic economy without 
stimulating that economy (e.g. by being internally reinvested) (Diamond 1965: 1141, 
1147). The Periphery’s debt – both public and private – whilst in the Eurozone has 
doubled or trebled giving the countries heightened risk and exposure (Lucarelli 2011: 
208). Whilst all sovereigns are subject to the volatility of the bond market, the structure 
of the Eurozone has acted as a reinforcing mechanism for capital flows, with investors 
drawn to ‘safer’ states, that of the Core (surplus states) (Palley 2011: 7; Pasiouras 2012: 
31).  This ultimately acts as a vicious cycle for the Periphery reinforcing their debt and 
volatility without the level of access to productive capital flows as the Core.  
 
This disproportionate exposure was largely ignored by the ECB, allowing for it to 
be exacerbated and thus increasing risk due to the lack of supra-state unity. As the 
monetary system became further integrated, national governments ceded control to the 
bond market. It is in this way that the EMU becomes the ‘master’ of national 
governments. This is due to the fact the ECB is structured as a ‘detached’ central bank, 
not authorised to buy government debt or act as a lender of last resort (Palley 2011: 7). 
As a consequence, individual Eurozone governments are exposed to confidence shifts 
and speculative attacks (Gill 1998: 25). These actions also delegitimise them as 
sovereign states, reducing member states to almost to the equivalent of corporations, 
unable to control their own debt through monetary policy or guarantee the repayment of 
external debt (Palley 2011: 11).  
 
Due to the structure of the Eurozone it is also possible for other member states’ 
elites’ to speculate against a government’s bonds, exacerbating the cost of borrowing 
(through betting against volatile nations debts) (Palley 2011: 9). This institutional 
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loophole was exploited during the Sovereign Debt Crisis, reinforcing the Core’s 
position as the safe-zone for capital and investment(this will be explained in more detail 
in Chapter 4). From the Eurozone member states’ perspective financialisation created a 
new space to establish themselves and their role in capitalist reproduction. Whilst 
finance introduced a new set of stakeholders to influence the power dynamics, these 
dynamics mimicked much of the pre-existing strategies. Core member states were able 
to strategically position their firms in the realm of productive capital to ensure primacy, 
and that their positions in financial markets mirrored this domination. This action was 
merely a component of state internationalisation, where states had to have a dualistic 
role in both national and international capital reproduction (Panich & Gindin 2012: 4).  
 
Conclusion 	  
The early years of the Eurozone highlight the nationalistic interests domination over 
cohesive economic governance. The Eurozone, as it was seen in Chapter 2, had 
developed a set of formal institutions that were favourable towards such nationalistic 
interests. This Chapter explored how these institutions were able to be exploited by key 
members at the expense of the weaker economies and the Zone as a whole, outside the 
purview of the ECB. The lack of institutional oversight allowed for the exacerbation of 
asymmetries across the Zone, with the assumption that a unified monetary policy would 
coherently adapt proving to be unfounded. The spaces that fell outside the Eurozone’s 
supra structural governance creating a vacuum that allowed for further exploitation by 
self interested members (and their firms). However these strategies were only 
selectively available requiring such pre-existing economic strength that it precluded the 
participation of the Periphery. The Zone was also exposed as rigid and inflexible to 
changing pressures, with the increasing role of finance. It became clear just how 
important this finance was to the Eurozone and how ill equipped its monitoring and 
accountability was to handle these new challenges. The majority of the first decade of 
the Euro saw the rise of asymmetry, public mismanagement, and Core member states 
reap the benefits of a favourable economic outlook at the expense of the Periphery. 
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Chapter 4 
A Greek Tragedy or A Eurozone Financial Crisis? 
 
Introduction 	  
Within its first decade the Eurozone (Zone) was in a position where it was forced 
to confront a crisis with a divided economy within its first decade. As demonstrated in 
the previous chapter, the Eurozone economy had been utilised to advance the interests 
of individual member states embedding asymmetry and weakening the Zone’s ability to 
act as a whole. The Eurozone institutional framework had been exploited to such a 
degree, and became so ill-configured, that it was unable to meaningfully respond to the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis (SDC or Crisis). That Crisis exposed the divided nature of the 
Eurozone, highlighting the shortcomings of the ECB’s crisis management and lack of 
responsiveness. The inbuilt nationalistic and strategic nature of the Zone meant that 
certain member’s interests were not abated in favour of the collective. Instead and 
perversely, those dominant interests were re-established in the new institutional 
infrastructure, particularly the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) that was 
created to manage the Crisis. This chapter will explore the inadequacy of the 
Eurozone’s response to financial crisis, revealing how the national interests of certain 
dominant groups exerted themselves throughout the creation of a new institution (and 
by doing so hindered its effectiveness).  The nature of the Sovereign Debt Crisis makes 
it imperative to draw on the role of bond markets in regards to the ability for member 
states to respond to the Crisis, especially in light of their inability to use monetary 
policy. Finally, this issue will be framed in terms of both national responses of certain 
members to the Crisis and the delayed supranational Eurozone response. 
 
4.1 What Happened to make the system falter? 
 
At the end of its first ten years the Eurozone had developed a dominant financial 
sector, an (arguably) two-speed economy compounded by a lack of supranational 
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supervision, making it highly vulnerable to an exogenous shock. The Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis (which would become the Global Financial Crisis) acted as the catalyst 
to uncover these weaknesses within the Eurozone. This Crisis became relevant for the 
Eurozone once toxic financial assets were exposed as being on the balance sheets of 
many major European commercial banks, necessitating large national bailouts (Sharma 
2014: 103). In turn these bailouts exposed the extent of public debt in various member 
states (especially as a percentage of GDP), which in some cases was misreported to the 
ECB. This in turn raised questions about government solvency of the affected member 
states and the ability of the Zone to respond collectively to the now Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, effectively threatening the viability of the Periphery (Sharma 2014: 106-7).  
 
 
4.2 Whose Responsibility was it? Supervision and Intervention in the ESCB 
 
In light of the SDC, state responsibility and institutional oversight were exposed 
as ill-adapted to the complexity of the Euro. The interconnectedness of trade and 
finance since the inception of the Euro had dramatically increased and the Eurozone’s 
institutions failed to keep pace with these changes. Whilst this is true for much of the 
developed world, the issues were compounded in the Eurozone by the level of 
integration and divergence.  The ECB recognised the need for change in 2005 with the 
ECB Financial Stability Review calling for a ‘widely accepted and rigorous framework’ 
in order to keep up with policy assessment’ (Goodhart & Tsomocos 2012a: 19). Whilst 
this recognition existed, the Eurozone failed to adequately respond, especially on a 
financial level as the Crisis developed.  
 
The Crisis exposed and exacerbated the most fragile and incongruous components 
of the Eurozone, and allowed these weaknesses to be exploited through new institutions 
in the banking and financial sectors. Financial supervision within the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB) was defective, never specifically delineating between the 
responsibility of National Central Banks (NCBs) and the ECB. This issue partially arose 
due to the question of who was more capable of providing better supervision, especially 
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considering the diverse, independent factors creating a crisis and the fact that crisis 
management was never a central feature of the Eurozone’s planning (Goodhart & 
Tsomocos 2012b: 468). The relinquishing of supervision to National Central Banks 
again made the role of oversight strategic and politically charged. Specifically, National 
Central Banks were, through the lack of alternative arrangements, given the 
responsibility of monitoring the quality of commercial bills in the money markets, as 
these were some of the more volatile bills that would need to be discounted in the case 
of a crisis. National Central Banks were expected to follow the Classical monetary 
economics principle of ‘real bills’ of central banking policy (Chailloux, Gray & 
McCaughrin 2008: 10). The focus of this principle is on setting policy to ensure that 
there is enough available money market assets to inject liquidity (Goodhart & 
Tsomocos 2012a: 123). Overall this diffusion of responsibility meant that both the ECB 
and NCBs effectively have less power to create and maintain a climate of financial 
stability. However this reduced NCBs to merely monitoring and consulting institutions, 
reliant on fiscal authorities for loans in order to create balance sheets for financial 
intervention (Goodhart & Tsomocos 2012b: 456).  
 
The underlying question then, is why did this structure arise, especially 
considering the risk associated with the financial sector? In response the answer is that 
this structure favoured those member states possessing strong fiscal authorities, leaving 
the Zone as a whole ignorant about the true cumulative risks as a consequence. In 
perspective the accumulation strategy had favoured those member states with strong 
fiscal records, which had accrued resources to be able to interact with the market in a 
meaningful and unencumbered way, and as a result those members were essentially 
strategically well positioned to handle the Crisis.  
 
During this time, the lack of supervision at a supranational level by the ECB 
allowed Greece’s to accrue 400€ billion of national debt, (approx. 140% of GDP) that 
threatened the strength of the Eurozone (Bongiovanni 2012: 228). The ‘fiscally 
responsible’ member states who, as it has previously been seen, exploited weaker states 
for success, were now poised to set the terms of the future of the Eurozone. They had 
strategically positioned themselves in such a way that both the ECB and the Periphery 
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required their consent to act, effectively instilling their national interest as part of the 
criteria in the new crisis management frameworks. This exposed the contradictory 
nature of national and supranational interests that were allowed to exist as part of the 
Eurozone’s haphazard institutional design. Due to this structure member states in the 
Periphery were facing harsh penalties for their actions, such as their fiscal 
irresponsibility, effectively imposed by the Core. These penalties manifested as the 
conditionality which the Core was able to impose on the Periphery, for example 
committing to greater trade liberalisation that would benefit the Core but at great 
expense to the Periphery (Krampf 2015: 183). 
 
In perspective, the institutions of the Eurozone were constructed around an 
ideology that failed to consider the importance of finance or the need for a redistributive 
mechanism other than the market (Krampf 2014: 304).  This meant that rather than the 
ECB adapting to the increasing role of global finance in Europe, financial markets have 
filled a gap, acting as a disciplinary device for careless national budgets (Yiangou, 
O’keeffe & Glockler 2013: 226). 
 
 
4.3 Who were they protecting? What made them act? 
 
Crisis intervention for the Eurozone failed to create an atmosphere of unity or 
trust, with intervention only occurring when strategically beneficial to Core countries 
(including in risk minimisation).  The first intervention by the ECB was the Long Term 
Refinancing Operation (LTRO), where the ECB undertook risk sharing, allowing for 
more assets to be used as collateral and extending loan lengths. Whilst this is 
conventional banking practice, its timing and broadening was strategically implemented 
to ‘minimze the exposure of German banks to infected banking systems’ (Krampf 2014: 
307). These strategies did initially serve Germany, with the response being concerted to 
reduce the risk to the Core. As a donor country, Germany wanted to maintain ‘last-
resort lending rather than harsh conditionality when it fears that the spread of the Crisis 
will affect its own economy or the stability of the international system’ (Krampf 2015: 
184). Germany, however, wanted to maintain its leverage, perpetuating the continued 
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opening of markets and conditionality being applied to debtor nations. Germany still 
saw itself as an atomistic actor, and was reluctant to support ESFS’s direct bailouts or 
the purchasing of sovereign bonds through the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) 
program without pressure from the Bank (Krampf 2015: 190-1). The Bank was now 
interested in its own preservation and perpetuation, and for that to occur the Core 
needed to provide the funds for its ongoing existence. The ECB however was not 
powerful enough on its own and required the the European Commission and heads of 
state to allow for the circumvention of governing Treaties, and the commitment of 
Germany. 
 
4.4 National Strategies 
 
The Crisis was initially dealt with on a solely national level. The Crisis for the 
Eurozone began in September of 2009, almost a full year after toxic subprime mortgage 
assets had been exposed in the US (Sharma 2012: 103). Nationalisation highlighted the 
self-interested nature of member states and the lack of cohesive Eurozone framework to 
deal with a crisis. Initially, most nations tried to bailout or nationalise local businesses 
in an attempt to reassure the public of the confidence in their banking system (Sharma 
2012: 103).  This process included nationalisation, bailouts and guarantees; for 
example: the Icelandic nationalization of Glitnir, one of their biggest banks; Belgium 
nationalizing Fortis, a banking and insurance company; Ireland ‘issuing guarantees of 
the deposits and debts including all liabilities of [their] six largest lenders’ and Greece 
publicly guaranteeing all bank deposits (Sharma 2012: 103-4).  
 
Whilst there were some bilateral national bailouts of firms, such as the French 
helping Belgium, or Netherlands and Luxembourg helping bailout Fortis, most of this 
process was situated at a national level, effectively lifting the debt from the commercial 
sphere and into the national public sphere (Sharma 2012: 104). It was a ‘country-by-
country’ strategy to deal with a financial crisis that was integrated throughout the 
continent. These initial national strategies of the Eurozone mimicked that of the US, 
where governments ‘assume[d]  colossal debt’(Sharma 2012: 102-105) However, unlike 
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the US, the Eurozone nations lacked the mechanism to increase the money supply as 
financial stress began to build and the cost of borrowing increased (Calice, Chen & 
Williams 2013: 123).  However this heightened the risk of sovereign default, as bond 
yields became increasingly volatile and, due to their European context, monetary policy 
remained inaccessible (Bongiovanni 2012: 227). 
 
The integrated and exposed nature of the bond market became a highlighted 
vulnerability of the system during the Sovereign Debt Crisis. With the removal of 
individual national exchange rate speculation, bond markets became the dominant 
mechanism for investors’ speculation throughout Europe.  The pricing of risky bonds is 
based on a simple assumption that investors should receive the same amount of interest 
as they would on safe bonds, plus a premium. However, the more uncertain the safety of 
the bond, the more the interest rate on the bond rises, as investors need a higher 
incentive to hold it (Palley 2011: 9). This idea is seen through the equation:  
 
E(R) = 1 + i* + z (1) 
Where E(R) = expected return from holding risky country bonds, i* = interest rate on 
safe bonds, z = required risk premium to hold risky country bonds (Palley 2011: 9). 
 
This, as we have seen before, essentially reduced Eurozone member states to the 
same position as corporations in a financial system - in the sense that investors can 
create circumstances where the bond yield is far higher than the risk premium by being 
able to ‘leverage highly speculative bet(s) on default,’ exploiting control over market 
liquidity and sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS), and where sovereign states cannot 
use monetary policy to intervene or guarantee the system, making debt restructuring 
significantly harder (Calice, Chen & Williams 2013:124). 
 
From this standpoint the bond market is a mutually reinforcing mechanism where the 
safest bond issuing country, Germany, attracted even more investment, ‘increasing the 
liquidity of [German bonds] and further driving down the German interest rate (Palley 
2011: 10). This process heightened the risk to other already structurally weak national 
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economies, compounded by the fact that their risk premium on Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS) was growing, making them more uncertain and unattractive to investors (Gaspar 
2011: 332). For high-risk member states this exposure to speculation had a two- 
pronged effect. First, a decline in the value of their bonds with exceedingly high interest 
rates attached to them strained their capital and liquidity, as bonds are used as collateral 
in interbank markets. Secondly, in many circumstances it forced an increase of 
government debt, as member states had to intervene to capitalise vulnerable domestic 
banking institutions (ECB 2015: Para 7).  In this context, National Central Banks were 
forced to engage to a greater extent with the bond market in order to ensure liquidity 
management, as the ECB was prohibited from providing emergency liquidity assistance 
in the case of financial crisis at this stage in the Crisis (Clerc & Mojon 2011: 269). The 
lack of an integrated strategy weakened and exacerbated member states economies and 
the Eurozone economy as a whole, forcing the escalation to a European level.	  	  
4.5 The Supranational  
 
The European response further suffered from a severe delay due to the lack of 
anticipation and an appropriate infrastructure for crisis management. This delay was 
partially due to the infrastructure of the ECB and Article 103 of the Maastricht Treaty 
that prohibited the acquisition of financing of another member state’s debt (Mulhern & 
Vane 2008: 100). It was also partially due to the lack of a crisis response plan in any of 
the European level institutions. The Eurozone’s Ordoliberal and neoliberal orientation 
had failed to anticipate the need for crisis management or the occurrence of a crisis on 
this scale. This meant that in 2010 the ECB needed to break with the spirit of its own 
mandate and issued its first bailouts through the roll out of the Securities Market 
Program (SMP) (Krampf 2014: 307). The SMP started with the purchase of €16.3 
billion in member bonds. This not only decreased the Bank’s independence but also 
severely compromising the ECB’s reserves (Belke 2010: 358).  
 
The Bank leveraged much of its reserves in order to commit to this process, 
significantly weakening its own position, and requiring backing from other nations, 
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particularly from the Core. The SMP was designed to ‘restore an appropriate monetary 
policy transmission mechanism,’ but it failed to instil long-term confidence (Darvas 
2012: 266). This ‘appropriate monetary mechanism’ was created to stop a secondary 
crisis or greater contagion, with the hope that bailouts at this point would limit risk to 
the Periphery (Sharma 2012: 104-5). For many of the failing member states it reinforced 
their ability to embrace the moral hazard, by not following through on conditionality 
once the ECB had engaged in buying bonds and re-engaging in reckless fiscal policies 
(as happened in Italy in 2011) (Darvas 2012: 266).  
 
Whilst these measures did manage to stifle a level of the contagion, they also 
weakened the Eurozone’s position on fiscal responsibility by removing the ‘no bailout’ 
principle, and thus shifted the onus onto the collective Zone to implicitly act in the 
interest of its weakest members (Belke 2011: 677). The programs were also met with a 
great deal of frustration from those Core members who were due to finance the new 
institutions. This was derived from the lack of control they would be able to exert over 
fiscal nature of other states; “Germany… argu[ed] that it would accept these institutions 
only if they were be accompanied by a fiscal union, in which ‘nation states give up their 
jurisdiction in terms of fiscal policy,” according to Schaüble11 (Krampf 2014:311). 
Germany was a necessary contributor to these institutions. In order to maintain its 
position as a benign leader rather than a malicious hegemon, it was necessary for 
Germany to make some concessions about the proposed nature of the bailouts and 
subsequent institutions.   
 
 
This short-sighted program, weakening the Eurozone’s overall position, was then 
intensified by the subsequent creation of the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF). The EFSF was a response to the revelation that the Crisis was systemic and 
required a response that was not permitted under ECB’s governing framework (Closa & 
Maatsch  2014: 839-40). The rigidity underpinning the ECB meant that any broadening 
of its mandate (including a temporary Lender of Last Resort function) would require 
unanimous ratification by all member states, with combined significant legal and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Wolfgang Schaüble has been Germany’s Minister for Finance since 2009-present 
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political implications and distributional issues in terms of funding (Dallago 2013: 210). 
The Eurozone was left in a position where in order for member states to act collectively 
an organisation outside of the established Treaties (e.g. Maastricht) had to be created, 
the European Financial Stability Facility. 
 
The EFSF was therefore created under the guise of solidarity and the united nature 
of the European economy. However the EFSF was only set up with a 3 year term and 
with a budget of €500 billion, made up of €60 billion from the EU and €440 of 
government guaranteed bonds to be raised through capital markets (which must be 
AAA rated –diminishing that amount in actuality), all complimented by €250 billion 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Arestis & Karakitsos 2013: 161) 12. The 
short term nature of the EFSF undermined its aims of strong conditionality of the loans 
the EFSF was providing with the institution seen as reactive creation, and only a 
temporary divergence from the ‘ultimate objectives,’ giving a perception that the 
pervading mandate was unchanged (Krampf 2014: 304). 
 
Whilst breaking with the strict sense of the Maastricht mandate, the EFSF still 
placed a great deal of emphasis on national responsibility. The EFSF is a facilitated 
funding program. Whilst its aim was to alleviate the Crisis and diminish its spread, all 
loans were conditional and have an expectation of repayment (Closa & Maatsch 
2014:829). These loans reinforced the idea that it was indeed the reckless behaviour of 
individual nations that prompted this position, and not systemic structural issues or the 
strategic exploitation by other member states, by placing the responsibility back on 
already fiscally struggling states. The EFSF has a high ‘penalty premium’ built into its 
interest cost that has reinforced the idea that bailouts were designed to protect the Zone 
from further damage and not save member states with whom they had a common 
financial interest (Lane 2011: 78). 
 
This common interest, however, was largely self-preservation for the Core. In 
2010 at the inception of the EFSF, German and French banks held more than $900 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Whilst the IMFs role in the Crisis and bailout is an important, due to this thesis’s focus being on the 
ECB, it will not be analyzed here. 
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billion of exposure to Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain (Gocaj & Meunier 2013: 
241). The integrated system meant that a last minute and haphazard response was 
necessary to prevent further spread of the Crisis throughout the European banking and 
financial system. The EFSF was destined to reinforce the same power dynamics, with 
the Bundesbank exceptionally resistant to assistance funding, demanding a short-run 3-
year program for the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), and that there be a penalty interest 
rate applied rather than economic solidarity and forgiveness (Varoufakis 2013: 58-9). 
These policies highlight the lack of progress that the Eurozone had made with 
individual member states, which still perceived themselves as atomistic and self-
interested. The Zone’s governance was still dominated by nationalistic interests and self 
advancement, attempting to re-establish accumulation patterns that favoured their 
interests rather than the entire Eurozone economy. The Eurozone institutions had failed 
to unify in any practical way, whilst the new institutions instilled the same strategic 
dynamics and rigidity that had come before.  
 
Conclusion 	  
The Sovereign Debt Crisis exposed the lack of cohesive governance and 
collective interests in the Eurozone. The SDC brought to the fore the level of 
asymmetry that had developed throughout the Eurozone, and also exposed just how 
futile the infrastructure of the Euro was to manage it. The Crisis however merely 
uncovered the asymmetric growth patterns and exposure that had been developing since 
the introduction of the Euro.  The established institution of the Eurozone, the ECB, had 
failed to supervise and manage national interests in order to prevent the vulnerabilities 
the Crisis uncovered. This is largely attributable to their mandate that favoured 
supervision only in areas that favoured Core accumulation, allowing for the Eurozone’s 
unanticipated financial vulnerability to go unnoticed. However the Eurozone also fell 
victim to its own lack of synchronicity and harmonisation, with a lack of sever enough 
interdependence that member states felt responsible for each other, but a monetary 
policy which necessitated collective action. Compounding this was a rigid ideology that 
had failed to consider crisis management at the inception of the Eurozone. This 
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culminated in the Eurozone’s lack of cohesive and timely management of the Crisis 
necessitating the creation of new governance institutions, the EFSF, to circumvent 
foundational treaties and the pre existing institutions, namely the ECB (Orphanides 
2011: 18)13. Both the EFSF and the ECB failed to act as a paradigm shifting influence 
for the Eurozone, insufficient to overcome national competition in the interest of the 
collective good (Krampf 2014: 304).  As this Chapter has shown these institutions, 
merely acted as a space for the Core to assert their interests over the collective. 
Ultimately leaving the Eurozone in a position where it exhibits systemic vulnerability to 
further crisis and ongoing asymmetry.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Orphanides is the Central Bank Governor of Cyprus  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis explored the extent to which the Eurozone has been weakened by the 
strategic behaviour of key actors. The Eurozone and its governance are undeniably an 
important component of the global economy, and this thesis has aimed to highlight the 
foundational causes underpinning its weaknesses. This refocusing has demonstrated the 
nature of the Eurozone’s shortcomings in through structural rigidity and biased 
governance structures. The European Central Bank (ECB) in particular has 
demonstrated its lack of capacity or strategic intent to govern in the interest of ‘mutually 
[or collectively] beneficial’ outcomes (Jessop 2003:101). The examination of the 
Eurozone through the theoretical lens of the Strategic Relational Approach (SRA) has 
allowed for a reconceptualization of the Eurozone’s structures and institutions of the 
Eurozone in a manner that reveals the systemic failures in the spaces where governance 
occurs. Ultimately this thesis has highlighted the strategically implemented limitations 
on governance in the Eurozone due to the social relations inherent in its structures and 
the self-interested goals and behaviour of key agents.    
 
Findings 
 
The continuing political and economic crises that plague the Eurozone have not 
been adequately explored within existing literature, that frames the debate narrowly 
round narratives of national blame. This thesis has provided a way in which to 
reconceptualise the nature of these responses to, these crises as an inherent and systemic 
feature of the structures and institutions of the Eurozone. The issues plaguing the 
Eurozone required a reframing in order to move away from the polarising debates 
around national blame and crisis management to a more holistic and nuanced 
interpretation. By starting with the establishment and formalising of the strategic 
interests within the institutions of the Eurozone, this thesis has made evident the 
structures that allowed for the perpetuation of nationally competitive mentalities and 
behaviour. The creation of the Eurozone was an inherently strategic project, and this 
thesis has demonstrated the way in which the realisation of this project has served as a 
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barrier to effective governance of the Eurozone as a collective. The determination of 
Core member states to have institutions reinforce an ideology congruent with their 
national economies resulted in the adoption and embedding of fragmented and biased 
processes of governance. These issues also exposed the Eurozone to vulnerability due to 
its rigidity to respond to changing circumstances and a lack of accountability distilled in 
the mandates of institutions whose role was theoretically to govern for all. Member 
states determination to maintain individualistic sovereign authority made them 
competitive and unable to adapt to the changing nature of global economy. It is through 
the strategic framing of nation states, and the nature of supranational governance to 
favour select groups that these issues became evident and understandable. Member 
states have to be perceived as actors whom are out to advance their position through the 
structures in which they operate.  
 
This thesis has aimed to highlight the role that pervasive ideology has had in 
reinforcing the Core’s accumulation strategies. In Chapter 2 it was argued that the Core 
did not mechanically superimpose or inscribe an ideology onto these institutions, but 
merely exploited the widespread acceptance of certain already existing ideologies. 
Through this it was able to entrench these existing ideologies into the emerging 
structures of the Eurozone in order to perpetuate its own material interests. Explicitly, 
this came in the use of neoliberal and Ordoliberal primacy of inflation targeting and 
business-friendly mentalities.  
 
With this established, Chapter 3 highlighted the way in which, once instituted, 
these systemic and structural imbalances in the Eurozone’s governance facilitated the 
development of specific national economies. This, however, merely served to 
exacerbate the structural biases and asymmetries existing across the Eurozone.  The 
thesis used industrial relations and fiscal policies as exemplars of the exploitation of the 
Eurozone’s lack of collective interest by Core member states. The lack of oversight in 
these areas allowed for the member states to advance their own interests at the expense 
of other member states. Whilst the Zone’s passive approach to the creation of a unified 
economy allowed for labour, finance and business policy to be utilised for nationalistic 
advancement. These policies, however, came at a cost of exacerbating the asymmetric 
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nature of the Eurozone’s economy.  It is no shock that these areas were pursued given 
the ideology under which the Zone was operating and the internal interests set to benefit 
from these policies. The initial development of the Eurozone lacked effective 
supranational governance, and that in turn created the vulnerabilities that became the 
fault lines for the Sovereign Debt Crisis.   
 
The Sovereign Debt Crisis however is where most of the contemporary literature 
lies and is an important component in situating the progress the Eurozone has made in 
its strategic and structural configuration. The Sovereign Debt Crisis exposed the extent 
to which the Eurozone is still composed of nationally interested, and strategically 
advantageous actors rather than a holistic economy.  Chapter 4 demonstrated this 
through the prolonged nationalistic management of the Crisis and the re-establishment 
of existing power structures with rigid ideology and the attribution of blame to 
particular strategies, rather than the underlying asymmetries of the system. Chapter 4 
demonstrated how the rigidity established in Chapter 1 within the ECB limited its 
capacity to respond effectively to the Crisis but also how the Eurozone failed to learn 
from these shortcomings. Indeed, the establishment following the Crisis of the 
European Financial Stability Facility demonstrated again the Core’s dominance and the 
Periphery’s weaknesses.  
 
Overall, this thesis has established how governance of the Eurozone lacks 
cohesion and congruence, with member states and institutions still strategically 
positioned in a competitive manner in relation to one another. The Eurozone governance 
infrastructure, particularly the European Central Bank, has failed to overcome this and 
create one collective economy that can adequately manage the complexity the Eurozone 
requires. 
 
Significance and Implications 
 
The effective management of the Eurozone is of considerable importance for the 
global economy. This thesis has refocused the debate around governance and the 
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strategic identities involved in the governance of Eurozone, rather than the traditional 
approach of nationalistic blame. Through the utilisation of Jessop’s SRA methodology 
this thesis has reframed the nature of the issues facing the Eurozone.  This refocusing 
provides a framework and a new way to conceptualise the governance of the Eurozone 
in the interests of future research, moving away from national based blame or merely 
crisis analysis. A reconceptualization of the Eurozone along these lines allows for the 
social and structural elements to be considered but has also provided and analytical 
tools to frame governance at this level. Whilst not explored here, this thesis suggests a 
way in which the Strategic Relational Approach could be utilised in order to frame the 
other governance institutions within the Eurozone (whilst maintaining a nation state 
level frame), in order to create a more comprehensive analysis. This strategic lens 
allows for the Eurozone to be seen for both the structures and the normatively instilled 
rules through which it functions, providing a means through which to trace their 
evolution.   
 
This thesis has created a position from which future research can examine the 
nature of the structural issues plaguing the Eurozone and the nature of the actors 
involved in its governance. It has highlighted national responsibility in a strategic sense, 
but has also stressed the importance of how strategic behaviour is responsible for 
creating systemic flaws in structure. In doing so it has emphasised as exemplars some of 
the crucial policy areas that can be re-examined. These include the expansive adaption 
of ideologically motivated policy commitments, rather than those that actively facilitate 
the conditions required for effective governance of the Eurozone. The Eurozone has 
been plagued by decisions underpinned by known illogical economic policies and 
criteria. These policies have had transparent political motivations, and have 
consequently affected the effective governance of the Eurozone. In light of this, future 
research must keep in mind the strategic relational context of governance in the 
Eurozone and the asymmetric relations of the power that continues to govern its 
structures and institutions.  
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